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Terrorist to Tyrant 
Thomas Myers 
“No ruling class has ever voluntarily and peacefully abdicated. In questions of life and death, 
arguments based on reason have never replaced the arguments of force.”  
 Leon Trotsky1 
 
ABSTRACT  
Successful terrorist groups can evolve to 
gain national power. This article consists of 
three case studies: the overthrow of the 
Russian Czar, the overthrow of the Shah of 
Iran and Hezbollah’s rise to power in 
Lebanon.  The three are compared in order 
to identify common stages in terrorist 
evolution. These stages are identified as 
Ideological Development, Small Group 
Terror, Mass Civil Unrest and Revolution, 
Revolutionary Victory and Consolidation of 
Power and finally, Tyranny.  Both the 
Russian and Iranian Revolutions followed 
the six stages to Tyranny while Hezbollah 
has not (yet) completed the fifth stage to 
power. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a July 2010 lecture, former FBI 
Deputy Director for the National 
Security Branch Philip Mudd spoke 
about counterterrorism strategy and al 
Qaeda Ideology.2 He addressed al Qaeda 
Prime, the core group of modern Islamic 
terrorists, and how it has influenced 
affiliates and likeminded groups. Their 
goal is the revolutionary overthrow of 
the Western-dominated world order and 
terrorism is their tactic. We are dealing 
with a revolution rather than simply a 
terror group. This article describes not 
terrorist organizations but revolutionary 
movements and their use of terror. 
Revolutionary movements are a 
product of social protest movements.  
Social protest movements are usually 
organized and act outside of the political 
system to either promote or prevent 
change in the existing social order.3 A 
revolutionary movement “uses 
confidential, violent terroristic activity” 
in order to achieve its ends.4 The 
objective of the revolutionary movement 
is the destruction of the existing social 
or political order so that it can be 
replaced with one conforming to its own 
ideology. For the purpose of this article, 
terrorism is defined as the calculated 
use of violence, outside of 
internationally accepted bounds of civil 
law and conventional military conduct, 
in the pursuit of political or social 
objectives.5 Internationally accepted 
bounds are those laid out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions.6  
Acts of terror alone do not overthrow 
governments and when used 
indiscriminately terror alienates the 
society it wishes to coerce. Without 
popular support, the ire of the state may 
be brought to bear on the isolated terror 
group; it is forced to flee or be 
destroyed. Those who use terror must 
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first justify its use. Without justification 
the group remains an illegitimate 
criminal organization in the eyes of the 
population and international 
community; the population sides with 
the state, perceived as the legitimate 
upholders of society. The terror-using 
group endeavors to turn the support of 
the populace away from the state and 
towards itself by undermining the 
legitimacy of the state.  
Repressive measures intended to 
control terrorism can alienate the 
public, shifting their support towards 
the revolutionary movement. The more 
popular support of the revolutionary 
movement grows, the more the 
legitimacy the state is brought into 
question.7 Terror groups may evolve in 
capability – from terrorists to insurgents 
to revolutionaries – as they meet with 
success, ultimately replacing the existing 
power structure.  
This article examines three 
revolutionary movements that used 
terror as a means to achieve their 
objectives: the overthrow of the Czar by 
the Russian Socialist Revolution, the 
overthrow of the Shah by Iranian 
Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah’s rise 
to power in Lebanon. The three are 
compared in order to analyze whether 
these are separate and unique 
occurrences or whether these might be 
indicative of the successful application 
of terrorism.  
The Russian Revolution is perhaps 
the quintessential revolutionary 
movement and one that has had a 
particularly large impact on the United 
States. In studying the Russian 
Revolution, I identified six 
developmental stages, which can be 
organized as a Revolutionary Terrorism 
Value Chain (RTVC).8 The six stages of 
the RTVC are: Ideological Development, 
Small Group Terror, Mass Civil Unrest 
and Revolution, Revolutionary Victory 
and Consolidation of Power, Tyranny, 
and Export of Terror and Expansion.  A 
successful terrorist group can evolve 
through these stages to gain national 
power. 
  Next, I researched the Iranian 
Islamic revolution, which likewise has 
had great impact on the U.S. Its parallels 
to the Russian Revolution helped refine 
and validate the RTVC. Finally, I applied 
the RTVC to Hezbollah because of its 
contemporary interest and because of its 
links to the Iranian Revolution. At this 
writing Hezbollah is in the fourth stage, 
providing the opportunity to observe 
whether it continues to evolve or if its 
development may be arrested or 
diverted.  
The RTVC illustrates how social 
revolutionary movements utilize 
violence through six stages of 
development. I refer to this use of 
violence as “revolutionary terror” in 
general through all six stages. Because 
different applications of violence are 
necessary in each stage, there are 
distinct types of terror within the 
general category of revolutionary terror. 
In all stages however, the violence is 
illegitimate and therefore characterized 
as terror. Identifying and analyzing the 
stages of a revolutionary movement may 
determine how terror will be used. This 
analysis enables the identification of 
collection requirements and indicators 
of terrorist operations and conversely 
allows tracking of the progression of a 
revolutionary movement. Because there 
are basic stages necessary to conducting 
a successful revolution, a common value 
chain can be applied to most 
revolutionary social movements.  
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THE REVOLUTIONARY 
TERRORISM VALUE CHAIN 
The Revolutionary Terrorism Value 
Chain consists of the following six 
stages. 
Stage One:  
Ideological Development 
A revolutionary social movement begins 
as an idea. The idea must present the 
case against the existing social or 
political order and the need for 
fundamental change. Once the existing 
order is deemed illegitimate the ideology 
justifies the use of violence as a means of 
achieving change. It is when the 
ideology rationalizes unlawful violence – 
that is to say terror – that the 
revolutionary terrorism value chain 
begins.   
Stage Two: Small Group Terror 
A core group acts upon the ideas 
developed in Stage One. Ideological 
propaganda in this stage appeals mainly 
to fringe elements easily branded as 
extremists. The existing power structure 
reacts with violent repression. Terror in 
this stage is used to manipulate an 
audience, either to gain sympathy for its 
cause or to create dissatisfaction with 
the existing social or political order. The 
existing social/political entity reacts 
with repressive measures intended to 
crush the terrorist. Overly repressive 
measures, however, prove 
counterproductive, creating widespread 
dissatisfaction leading to the next stage.  
Stage Three:  
Mass Civil Unrest and Revolution   
The ideology gains mass appeal enabling 
the core group to create a political 
organization that eventually gains 
legitimacy. Ideological propaganda 
becomes more sophisticated and more 
widely accepted. Small group terror 
continues, however; the core group 
maintains a separation between the 
action cells, responsible for acts of 
sabotage, assassination and 
kidnappings, and the larger political 
party formed out of the disaffected 
population. Legitimate means of civil 
protest – including protest marches, 
general strikes and sit-ins – are 
employed by the overt political party. A 
second type of terror tactic emerges in 
the form of riots and lynching of 
opposition figures. These acts are made 
to appear spontaneous but are in fact 
centrally coordinated culminating in a 
popular armed revolution.  
Stage Four: Revolutionary Victory 
and Consolidation of Power  
The revolution overthrows the former 
government and the core group 
consolidates power. Consolidation of 
power is defined as the ability of the 
core group to impose its will over the 
entire country and exercise effective 
control of instruments of national 
power. In this stage terror becomes a 
mechanism to eliminate political rivals. 
Successful revolutions are often the 
result of the united effort of several 
parties that may have differing 
objectives. Some of these parties will not 
use illegitimate violence and fall victim 
to those who do. The most ruthless of 
these parties will apply terror in the 
forms of intimidation, assassination, 
and – when it has gained enough power 
– through the arrest and imprisonment 
or execution of its rivals.  
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Stage Five: Tyranny  
Tyranny is defined as centralized rule 
over a nation, benefiting the ruler rather 
than the ruled, and uses violence in a 
manner considered unlawful by modern 
international norms of behavior. With 
rival parties eliminated, a power 
struggle within the core group ensues. 
The most ruthless faction wins and 
imposes autocratic rule. Terror becomes 
an integral function of the regime 
applied through a state security 
apparatus. These secret police are used 
to repress opposition and indoctrinate 
the population. National power is 
strengthened through forced 
conscription and the diversion of 
economic assets to the defense industry.  
Stage Six:  
Export of Terror and Expansion  
The regime seeks to expand its sphere of 
influence. Terror or the threat of terror 
is used as a tool in foreign policy to 
threaten hostile states. Foreign small-
group terrorists are provided training, 
financial support, and weapons with the 
twin objectives of spreading the 
revolutionary ideology and intimidating 
foreign enemies. 
 
There is a danger of forcing events to fit 
into this framework. It is important to 
remember that these stages are meant to 
be broad and general. Overlap and 
concurrence particularly in the latter 
stages do not invalidate the overall idea 
that terror campaigns evolve and, if 
successful, can become national 
governments. The first example in the 
twentieth century of the successful 
application of terrorism in the 
achievement of political and social 
change is the Socialist Revolution in 
Russia. 
CASE 1: TERROR AND SOCIAL 
REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA  
Ideological Development 
The Russian revolution really began in 
the late nineteenth century. Although 
Czar Alexander II (who ruled from 1855 
to 1881) was attempting modernization 
using the Western model, much of the 
country remained in a state of feudal 
peasantry.9 The Russian intelligentsia 
was also taking ideas from the West.  
In Russia, Mikhail Bakunin and 
Sergey Nechayev were two early Russian 
proponents of terror as a political 
weapon used to incite rebellion.10 Both 
went into exile in Western Europe and 
met other revolutionary ideologues such 
as Karl Marx, developing ideas similar to 
the Italian thinker Carlo Pisacane who 
wrote, “Ideas result from deeds.”11  
Pisacane thought violence was necessary 
to grab attention and rally the 
population behind a revolution. 
Small Group Terror 
The Narodnaya Volya, or People’s Will, 
founded in the late 1870s, put the ideas 
of the intellectuals into practice. In an 
attempt to win over the peasants, 
Narodnaya Volya committed acts of 
terror to attract attention to the cause.12 
The Narodnaya Volya targeted 
government officials and members of 
the ruling class for their symbolic value 
as members of the czarist regime.13 The 
Narodnaya Volya hoped terror would 
undermine the people’s confidence in 
the government and win support for 
regime change. 
 Narodnaya Volya succeeded in 
assassinating the czar himself, but it 
turned out to be a pyrrhic victory.14 One 
of the assassins was captured and 
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provided the information needed to 
track down the terror organization. By 
1883 Narodnaya Volya ceased to exist.15  
Remnants of the group helped form the 
Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in the 
early twentieth century.16  
Civil Unrest 1905    
The Socialist Revolutionaries continued 
the terror campaign. Russian terrorism 
was evolving. The Socialist 
Revolutionaries advocated “terrorism, 
not in place of work among the masses, 
but precisely for and simultaneously 
with that work”.17 The political 
revolutionary organization replaced the 
terror group as the prime vehicle for the 
revolution. Vladimir Lenin, an exiled 
leader of the revolutionaries, 
differentiated between “individual” 
terror – which he saw as a substitute for 
popular active support of the masses – 
and the kind of terrorism by the masses 
associated with the uprising of 1905.18  
The revolutionaries did not renounce 
terror; the tactics of bombings and 
assassinations continued to be used. 
Now, however, the “combat 
organization" (responsible for 
“individual” terrorism) operated 
separately from the party so as not to 
jeopardize its political actions.19  If the 
state took down a terrorist cell, the 
political arm of the revolution could 
disavow them and continue their 
activities. 
When a group of unemployed 
workers began demonstrations in St. 
Petersburg, Georgi Gapon, an Orthodox 
priest, decided to make a personal 
appeal to Nicholas II on their behalf. He 
drew up a petition outlining the workers' 
demands and on January 22, 1905, led a 
large procession of workers to the 
Winter Palace in order to present the 
petition. Police and Cossacks attacked 
the procession and more than 100 
workers were killed.  The incident, 
known as Bloody Sunday, signaled the 
start of the 1905 Revolution. The Czar 
violently crushed the massive 
demonstrations and strikes that spread 
throughout the empire.20 The ruthless 
manner in which the revolt was put 
down destroyed public trust in the 
government, further legitimizing violent 
opposition to the state.21 
Revolutionary Victory  
February 1917 
In 1917 Russia was at war and losing to 
the Germans. In February, a general 
strike in St. Petersburg exploded into a 
second revolution. Unlike 1905, the 
Russian Army joined the workers, 
forcing Nicholas II to abdicate his 
throne, and a new Russian government 
was formed. A group known as the 
Mensheviks led the new Provisional 
Government. 
Unable to solve many of the problems 
faced by the Czar, including the 
continued war with Germany, the 
provisional government faced its own 
difficulties with social unrest.  The 
flames of unrest were fanned by radicals 
released from the Czar’s prisons and 
others returning from exile. One of the 
key people returning from exile was 
Vladimir Lenin. His Bolsheviks had 
organized workers, peasants, and 
soldiers into a powerful political force.  
The Bolsheviks felt that Russia should 
make peace with Germany, ending the 
war immediately.22 Continuing the 
mistakes of the Czarist regime, the 
Mensheviks began arresting radicals, 
which alienated the working class. When 
the situation became desperate, the 
leader of the provisional government 
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sought the help of the Bolsheviks, who 
played a key role in defending the 
provisional government, enabling them 
to gain even deeper support from the 
Russian people. When elections took 
place, the Bolsheviks won a majority of 
the seats in the soviets in Petrograd, 
Moscow, and other cities.23 
Consolidation of Power  
October 1917 
On October 24-25, 1917, pro-Bolshevik 
soldiers, sailors, and Red Guards 
stormed the Winter Palace and arrested 
members of the provisional government. 
This "bloodless coup" put the Bolsheviks 
in power.24  Russia soon found itself in a 
civil war between the "Whites" (White 
Guard Volunteer Army) led by General 
Kornilov, and the “Reds” led by the 
Bolsheviks.25 The Bolsheviks, who 
became known as the Communists, were 
besieged by not only the Whites, but also 
the Allies (Great Britain, France, and the 
United States), who feared international 
communism would spread to their own 
countries.26 Eventually the Allied Forces 
withdrew and the Whites were defeated. 
Once in power the Communist use of 
terrorism transformed into a means of 
controlling internal enemies and coping 
with international strife. Political 
opponents were rounded up and 
executed or imprisoned. Meanwhile, 
threatening the export of terrorism held 
off hostile nations, primarily Western 
Europe and the United States. 27 
Stalin and Tyranny 
With the death of Lenin a brief power 
struggle ensued within the Communist 
Party. Stalin’s ruthless application of 
terrorism removed his rivals and cowed 
his doubters as he took power. His use 
of violence to eliminate real and 
perceived opponents did not conform to 
international norms of acceptable use of 
national power. His archrival Leon 
Trotsky, himself a practitioner of 
terrorism, fled to exile in Mexico where 
he was eventually assassinated by 
Stalin’s henchmen.  
Stalin institutionalized terrorism in 
the Soviet Union. The Communist Party 
and the state’s police, military, and 
security apparatuses became 
instruments of his personal will. A 
biographer described Stalin’s political 
purges and imprisonments, and forcible 
impressments and deportations, as a 
“conspiracy to seize total power by 
terrorist action,” resulting in the death 
of millions.28 
After Stalin, the USSR continued to 
rule through fear. In the West, Siberia 
has become synonymous with political 
exile. Terrorism continued to be 
exported through support given to 
international terrorist organizations 
such as the German Bader-Mienhof 
group and the Italian Red Army Brigade. 
For many, communism and terrorism 
were and remain inextricably linked. 
SUMMARY CASE 1 
I have identified six stages of terror in 
the Russian Revolution. The first stage is 
the development of an ideology; in 
Russia this began as early as the 1850s. 
Mikhail Bakunin and Sergey Nechayev 
were two early Russian proponents of 
terror as a political weapon used to 
incite rebellion.29  It is important to note 
that terror is not the ideology; rather, 
the ideology legitimizes the use of terror 
as a means to an end. In Russia the 
ideology eventually developed into 
communism. The early ideologues spent 
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much time in exile, expounding their 
radical views, and little time actually 
committing terror in Russia.   
Stage two is the application of small 
group terror. If stage one is that of word, 
stage two is that of deed. Bakunin and 
Nechayev’s words inspired others to act 
upon their ideology. Small groups or 
cells of violent radicals with little mass 
appeal characterize this stage; 
Narodnaya Volya was such a group. 
These terrorists came largely from the 
intellectual class and hoped to incite 
rebellion among the lower classes 
through their violent acts. When they 
failed to gain support through their 
deeds, they hoped to cause increased 
repression by the state, which they 
hoped would finally turn the people 
against the government. With little 
popular support, the terrorists were 
crushed by the government crackdown.   
This led to the third stage: mass civil 
unrest used by the terrorist/intellectuals 
to form a revolutionary movement. The 
increased repression of the czarist 
government was one of several causes of 
social upheaval. The successors to the 
Narodnaya Volya, the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, formed the now 
discontented people into political 
organizations and paramilitary fighting 
groups. The Socialist Revolutionaries 
orchestrated strikes, demonstrations, 
riots and other forms of mob violence as 
a sort of mass terror campaign against 
the state. Small group terror continued 
but now in a supporting role. 
Stage four: the victory of the 
revolution and consolidation of power. 
The revolutionary movement was not 
homogenous in Russia. Competing 
ideological groups cooperated towards 
the common goal of transforming 
Russian society. With the fall of the 
Czar, the victorious coalition fought with 
each other for supremacy. The 
Bolsheviks used political terror to 
eliminate their competitors while at 
same time using propaganda and 
providing bread and services to ensure 
the support of the people.   
Stage five: tyranny. Lenin and the 
Communists successfully consolidated 
power through a reign of terror and by 
winning the civil war. Resistance was 
not tolerated, a police state was 
instituted, and the population was 
systematically indoctrinated in 
communist ideology. The revolutionary 
intellectuals now held total power as the 
new ruling class, dictating what was 
“best” for the lower class.  
The sixth and final stage: the export 
of terrorism.  In the weakness of its early 
years, the Russian Soviet state 
threatened hostile nations with the 
export of terrorism as a defensive 
strategy. This became an 
institutionalized part of Soviet foreign 
policy throughout the life of the USSR, 
as evidenced by its support of 
international terrorist organizations.   
The next section tests the validity of 
the six stages of the Revolutionary 
Terrorist Value Chain by applying them 
to the Iranian Islamic Revolution. 
CASE 2: TERROR AND  
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN 
The Islamic revolution in Iran provides 
striking parallels with the Russian 
revolution. In each case there was a 
monarch attempting to modernize the 
country. In both countries there was a 
large poor agrarian lower class. A feared 
secret police apparatus ruthlessly 
repressed dissent. A revolutionary 
leader in exile in Western Europe 
returned after civil unrest toppled the 
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monarchy. A totalitarian regime 
replaced the monarchy and engaged in a 
war with a fascist dictator on their 
western border. And both successful 
revolutions used terror to gain maintain 
and extend their power. 
Ideological Development  
In 1941 Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi 
succeeded his father to become the shah 
of Iran.  In the post war years the shah 
sided with the western powers, but in 
1951 Muhammad Mossadegh, a militant 
nationalist, became prime minister. 
Mossadegh attempted to nationalize the 
oil industry, which was controlled by 
western companies. The United States 
feared he would allow the Soviet Union 
to gain control of Iranian oil resources.  
Bowing to U.S. pressure, the shah 
dismissed the prime minister in 1953. 
Mossadegh, however, had popular 
support and instead induced the shah to 
flee to Rome. Riots ensued and the shah 
won back control, returning to Iran and 
sending Mossadegh to prison. The shah 
pursued agricultural and economic 
modernization but, despite growing 
prosperity, opposition to the Shah grew 
as well. Chief among the opposition 
were Shiite Muslim clerics who called 
for the recognition of Islamic law. 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in exile 
first in Iraq and later in France, became 
the acknowledged leader of the clerics. 
The shah hoped liberal reforms would 
gain popular support. When Khomeini 
issued a fatwa against his reforms, the 
government responded with ridicule in 
an attempt to undermine the cleric’s 
influence. This tactic backfired, winning 
new support for Khomeini from the 
religious community. 
Small Group Terror 
The shah came to be seen as a puppet of 
the United States and the CIA was 
commonly thought to have orchestrated 
Mossadegh’s removal. An underground 
group of pious Muslims formed a terror 
organization known as the Fedaiyan-e 
Islam. This organization attempted to 
assassinate some of the shah's officials. 
The government responded with a crack 
down on the Fedaiyan-e Islam, 
capturing and executing its members.30 
Mass Civil Unrest and Revolution 
The shah’s secret police, the SAVAK, 
and the army cracked down on dissent. 
As government repression grew 
disturbances spread across the country. 
From Iraq, Khomeini ordered strikes 
and demonstrations. Religious students 
led protests, turning into riots, against 
the shah’s reforms.31 By 1978, Iran was 
in chaos and the regime declared martial 
law.   
When protest broke out in the capital 
of Tehran, the army used deadly force 
(instigating what became known as 
Black Friday) and hundreds – perhaps 
thousands – were killed.  The killing 
became too much for the soldiers, many 
of whom refused to fire on their 
countrymen and changed sides. Like the 
Russian czar, the shah could not retain 
power without the army; he accepted the 
formation of a new government and 
went into exile.32 
Revolutionary Victory and 
Consolidation of Power 
Shahpour Bakhtiar, the head of one of 
the largest opposition groups, the 
National Front, led the new 
government.33 Attempts at reform were 
opposed by Khomeini, who declared 
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Baktiar’s appointment as prime minister 
by the shah as illegitimate. Khomeini 
renewed his calls for dissent, this time 
against the new government.  Bakhtiar 
represented secular intellectuals and 
Islamic moderates, who felt they could 
control Khomeini, and so he was 
allowed to return from exile. Khomeini, 
however, was not content to allow a 
secular democratic government to 
remain in power. 
Khomeini returned to Iran to popular 
acclaim. His followers continued to 
demonstrate and Khomeini demanded 
Bakhtiar’s resignation. The ayatollah’s 
supporters seized government buildings 
and forcibly took power in a second 
revolution reminiscent of Russia’s 
October Revolution in which Lenin’s 
Bolsheviks seized power from the 
provisional Russian government. State 
terror followed the ayatollah’s power 
grab. Those who had supported the shah 
were executed or went into exile. 
Political opponents were imprisoned or 
executed and buried in mass graves. 
When the United States allowed the 
shah admittance for medical care, 
massive protests erupted in Tehran, 
culminating in the storming and seizure 
of the U.S. embassy. The embassy staff 
were held hostage, which led President 
Jimmy Carter to authorize a military 
rescue operation. The operation ended 
in disaster when several aircraft were 
accidentally destroyed in the Iranian 
desert. The hostage crisis has commonly 
been cited as a major contributing factor 
in Carter’s loss to Ronald Reagan in the 
1980 U.S. presidential elections.  
In an attempt to capitalize on the 
chaos, neighboring Iraq seized disputed 
territory from Iran. The resulting war 
lasted eight years and resulted in more 
than two million dead and wounded. It 
was during this war that Iran developed 
the suicide bomber tactic to counter 
Iraq’s technical superiority. 
Tyranny 
Banks and industry were nationalized, 
political opposition banned, and wealth 
confiscated from the rich. Former allies 
began to turn against Khomeini, but 
soon found themselves imprisoned, 
exiled, or dead. Khomeini instituted 
sharia law and exercised complete 
control over Iranian society. Moral 
infractions became punishable by 
stoning. Foreign films were banned or 
heavily censored and religious police 
patrolled the streets enforcing modest 
dress and behavior.  
Export of Terror and Expansion 
Just as the success of the communists in 
Russia inspired socialists in Western 
Europe, the Islamic revolution in Iran 
inspired Muslims throughout the Middle 
East. Khomeini and his followers found 
they could extend their influence beyond 
their borders. The Shia clerics found 
they even gained admirers among Sunni 
Arabs 
Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), was among the first to express 
admiration. This was the beginning of a 
long symbiotic relationship between 
Iran and Palestinian terrorists. The PLO 
had a stronghold in southern Lebanon. 
Iran found fertile ground in the Shia 
community in Lebanon.  The Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard was dispatched to 
train the Shia militia engaged in the 
Lebanese civil war and to form the 
Lebanese Hezbollah. Through the 
Hezbollah, Iran has been able to conduct 
a proxy war against Israel and to aid 
Palestinian terrorists. 
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SUMMARY CASE 2 
The Iranian Islamic Revolution 
conforms quite closely to the six stages 
of terror identified in the Russian 
Revolution. The first stage is the 
development of an ideology: in Iran this 
revolved mainly around the Shia clerics, 
although there were westernized secular 
intellectuals and Marxists involved as 
well. In Iran the ideology eventually 
developed into Islamic fundamentalism, 
as it is known in the West.  
Stage two is the application of small 
group terror. The Fedaiyan-e Islam was 
the Narodnaya Volya of Iran. These 
terrorists were religiously motivated to 
conduct acts of terror against the 
government. Like the Narodnaya Volya, 
the Fedaiyan were crushed by a 
government crackdown.   
This led to the third stage, mass civil 
unrest, used by the Islamists and 
intellectuals to form a revolutionary 
movement. The increased repression by 
the shah was one of several causes of 
social upheaval. Strikes, 
demonstrations, riots, and other forms 
of mob violence erupted in a mass terror 
campaign against the state.  
Stage four: the victory of the 
revolution and consolidation of power. 
Competing ideological groups had 
cooperated in pursuing the common 
goal of transforming Iranian society. 
With the fall of the shah, the victorious 
coalition fought with each other for 
supremacy. The Islamists used political 
terror to eliminate their competitors, 
while at same time using propaganda 
and providing bread and services to 
ensure the support of the people.   
Stage five: tyranny.  Ayatollah 
Khomeini and the Islamists successfully 
consolidated power through a reign of 
terror. Resistance was not tolerated, a 
police state was instituted and the 
population was systematically 
indoctrinated into Islamic ideology. 
The sixth and final stage: the export 
of terrorism. In the weakness of its early 
years the Iranian Islamic state 
threatened hostile nations with the 
export of terrorism as a defensive 
strategy.  This became an 
institutionalized part of Iranian foreign 
policy best exemplified by the Iranian 
proxy in Lebanon – the subject of Case 
Three, the Hezbollah. 
CASE 3: THE HEZBOLLAH   
Hezbollah, the “Party of God”, has some 
100,000 supporters (about half of whom 
are party members) and an annual 
budget in excess of $100 million, much 
of which comes from Iran, Hezbollah's 
major patron. Hezbollah regards Iran's 
supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali 
Khomeini, as its ultimate leader and 
maintains close ties to Iran's leadership, 
especially to the hard-line clerics who 
helped organize the party in the early 
1980s.   
Like the Russian revolutionaries, 
Hezbollah claims to fight the oppressors 
of the downtrodden.  In its 1985 
manifesto Hezbollah listed three main 
goals: “putting an end to any colonialist 
entity” in Lebanon; bringing the 
Phalangists to justice for “the crimes 
they [had] perpetrated,” and the 
establishment of an Islamic regime in 
Lebanon.34 Hezbollah’s Shia Muslim 
followers are strongly anti-West and 
anti-Israeli.35 In 2000, Hezbollah forced 
Israel to withdrawal from Lebanon. This 
victory raised the movement to greater 
prominence in Lebanon and the greater 
Muslim world.36 
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Ideological Development 
Like the communists of Russia, 
Hezbollah was born of social strife and 
intellectuals inspired its creation. In the 
1970s Lebanon was a nation of warring 
factions. Christians, Sunnis and Shiite 
fought for control.37 Like the peasants of 
Russia, the Lebanese Shiites were 
largely poor farmers and laborers with 
little political power.38 Religiously 
motivated intellectuals of the Shia sect – 
such as Imam Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah in Lebanon, who was usually 
described as the spiritual leader of 
Hezbollah, and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini in Iran – developed the ideas 
that inspired future generations of 
Muslim activists. In 1975, Fadlallah 
wrote his book, Islam and the Logic of 
Force, which explains that military force 
must serve the aims of Islam in its war 
against infidels and imperialists.39 Like 
the early Russian intellectuals, the 
Muslim ideologues were more men of 
words than of deed. 
The Shiite militia, Amal, that 
preceded Hezbollah was formed in 1975 
by Imam Musa Sadr. Sadr had been 
raised in Iran and trained at the same 
religious schools attended by Iran’s 
Ayatollah Khomeini. As Amal, the 
largest Shia militia in Lebanon, 
struggled to settle sectarian differences 
peacefully, the more radicalized Shiites 
aimed for the establishment of an 
Iranian-style Islamic state. At the 
conclusion of the Israeli siege, the newly 
installed Khomeini regime in Iran sent 
Revolutionary Guards to southern 
Lebanon. The Revolutionary Guards 
provided military training for the 
existing Shiite militia and helped form 
Hezbollah, a new, more radical Islamic 
faction. The words of the intellectuals 
had formed the ideology to motivate 
terrorists. 
Small Group Terror 
The PLO was the Narodnaya Volya of 
Lebanon and Israel played the part of 
the czarist regime. The PLO, basing 
itself in South Lebanon, waged a terror 
campaign against Israel and the West. 
In June 1982, the Israelis responded by 
invading Lebanon, routing the PLO, and 
occupying the southern portion of the 
country. 
In late August 1982, a multinational 
peacekeeping force arrived in Beirut to 
evacuate the PLO. This ended the small 
group terror waged by the PLO. A month 
later, Christian Phalangists swept into 
the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and 
slaughtered hundreds of Palestinian 
civilians. A multinational peacekeeping 
force of mostly U.S., French, and Italian 
troops occupied barracks at the Beirut 
airport. 
Civil Unrest  
The massacre in the refugee camps, like 
Bloody Sunday in Russia and Black 
Friday in Iran, served as a catalyst for 
the Shiites. A series of suicide truck 
bombs struck targets associated with the 
multinational force and the Western 
powers. The terrorist organization, 
Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility. 
Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad shared the 
same leaders.40 Like the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, it seemed Hezbollah 
wanted the fighting organization to 
appear as a separate entity.   
Where the PLO was a foreign entity 
with little backing from the population, 
the Shiite terrorists enjoyed the support 
of a large population base.  The 
multinational force was pulled out, but 
the attacks did not stop. 
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Hezbollah/Islamic Jihad was behind not 
only the bombing of the U.S. Marine 
barracks but also the 1985 hijacking of a 
TWA flight in Beirut. They also claimed 
responsibility for many of the 
kidnappings and assassinations in 
Lebanon, including that of Terry 
Anderson and CIA Station Chief William 
Buckley.41  
Hezbollah's spiritual leader, Sheikh 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, insisted 
that Hezbollah stood for moderation 
and restraint: "It is a mass movement 
that concentrates on facing political 
problems.”42 As the Russian 
communists had done with the working 
class and peasants, Hezbollah developed 
support from among the poor Shia 
peasants and young people in West 
Beirut’s poor Shia suburbs. Hezbollah 
spread propaganda through films, 
ideological seminars, and radio 
broadcasts to indoctrinate followers and 
recruit fighters. Additionally, Hezbollah 
provided public services such as 
education and health care. By late 1984, 
Hezbollah had become not only a 
militant organization but also a powerful 
political entity. Based in the Bekka 
Valley and Southern Lebanon, they 
conducted their own terror campaign 
against Israel.43  
Once again Israel responded with 
military force to drive Hezbollah from 
the southern border of Lebanon. During 
the onslaught, Israeli forces assassinated 
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas 
Mussawi. Mussawi's successor, Sheikh 
Hassan Nasrallah, vowed revenge. 
Rather than directly attacking the 
powerful Israeli Army, Hezbollah struck 
soft targets.  In Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
a suicide bomber exploded at the Israeli 
embassy and Islamic Jihad claimed 
responsibility. Other acts of 
international terrorism followed; a 
Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires 
was bombed as were Jewish targets in 
London. 
Political Victory 
The Lebanese government had been 
struggling since the end of the civil war 
in 1991.  When Israel invaded in 1992 
the government was unable to respond 
effectively. It was Hezbollah that faced 
the invasion and won, gaining immense 
national prestige in the process. Much as 
the Bolshevik defense of the provisional 
government in 1917 set them up to seize 
power in Russia, the repulsion of the 
Israelis did the same for Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. 
In 1993 Iranian sources estimated the 
number of Hezbollah fighters at 5,000 
strong.44 Hezbollah’s military branch 
included not only members recruited 
from the unemployed, but also doctors, 
engineers, and other professionals; the 
party’s political cadres and workers were 
estimated to be 3,000. Within the larger 
guerrilla organization, Hezbollah has 
retained small terrorist cells organized 
on an informal basis.   
When Lebanon’s various militias 
were disbanded, Hezbollah was allowed 
to keep its fighting capacity intact and it 
became, in effect, a second national 
army. The small terror group 
transitioned into a supporting role. 
Hezbollah’s political wing became a 
legitimate political force in the Lebanese 
Parliament.45 
Consolidation of Power 
Hezbollah is currently in the 
consolidation of power stage. There has 
been some struggle for leadership of 
Hezbollah over the years. In the early 
years of the movement the most 
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significant Shiite leader was Imam Musa 
Sadr. Sadr wanted the Lebanese Shia 
community to remain independent of 
Iran and keep its distance from the 
Palestinian resistance movement.  
Sheikh Muhammud Hussein 
Fadlallah, a disciple of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, arrived in Lebanon in 1966. 
Fadallah did not become prominent in 
the Lebanese Shia community until Sadr 
disappeared under suspicious 
circumstances while on an official visit 
to Libya. Fadlallah became Hezbollah’s 
spiritual leader and encouraged support 
for the Palestinian resistance to Israel. 
Fadlallah passed away on July 4, 2010. 
Hezbollah’s Secretary General Nasrallah 
now appears to be in complete control of 
the organization.  
If control of the party is resolved, 
control of Lebanon is not. The 2003 
assassination of the popular politician 
Rafik Hariri may have been an attempt 
to eliminate Hezbollah’s competition for 
power. If this is true, it backfired when 
much of the population demonstrated 
against the attack. Blame was placed on 
the Syrian Government, which resulted 
in the withdrawal of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon.46   
However, Hariri had close ties to 
Saudi Arabia’s ruling family – Iran’s 
Sunni rival – making him a rival of 
Hezbollah as well.47 Whether or not 
Hezbollah was involved, Hariri’s death 
has left it the dominant political force in 
Lebanon. This stage will culminate 
when, or if, Hezbollah gains total control 
of the Lebanese government. That will 
open the way for the final stage, tyranny. 
As did the Soviets, Hezbollah already 
uses the threat of terrorism as a foreign 
policy tool and seeks to expand its 
sphere of influence, particularly through 
its relationship with Hamas in Gaza. 
Hezbollah threatens terrorism out of 
weakness; this continues to be true in its 
dealings with the West. Its conventional 
military, however, continues to gain 
strength. The private intelligence 
organization, Stratfor (citing Reuters) 
reported Sheikh Naim Qasim, deputy 
leader of Hezbollah, as saying military 
action against Iran by Israel or the 
United States could result in violence 
across the Middle East.48 Although 
Qasim did not say what actions 
Hezbollah might take, he asserted that 
any country involved in an attack on 
Iran would face reprisals and that 
Hezbollah is ready for another war with 
Israel.49  
SUMMARY CASE 3 
It may be useful to refer to Hezbollah 
not as a terrorist organization but rather 
as a social revolutionary organization 
that uses terrorism to achieve political 
goals. Hezbollah has evolved through 
the first four stages of terrorism. 
Building on an ideology developed by 
Imams and Ayatollahs, Hezbollah 
experienced, almost from the start, 
parallel development of the fighting 
organization and the overt political 
organization. Through small group 
terrorism and mass appeal, Hezbollah 
has successfully transformed itself into a 
powerful political and social force. 
Having won legitimization it now seeks 
to consolidate its power and gain 
complete control of Lebanon. Should 
Hezbollah’s success continue, it is 
possible Lebanon will be transformed 
into an autocratic regime using terror to 
cow internal opposition and continuing 
to export terror as it seeks to expand its 
sphere of influence. 
Hezbollah’s legitimate political 
standing creates the opportunity to turn 
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them away from violence. Hezbollah is 
already responsible for a large portion of 
the Lebanese population and will act to 
retain their support. The U.S. can 
leverage public opinion in Lebanon 
through its dealing with Hezbollah, 
either treating them as criminals or as a 
legitimate political entity. Hezbollah has 
brought some stability to the country; 
should it be destroyed, Lebanon will 
likely return to the chaos of the 1970s. It 
may be that Hezbollah has grown too big 
to fail.  
OVERALL SUMMARY  
The use of terror is a rational strategy 
for combating an enemy possessing 
overwhelmingly greater resources. The 
terrorist is under no illusion that he can 
inflict enough damage to defeat his 
enemy solely through acts of terror. He 
knows he must win mass support. When 
the population believes the grievances of 
terrorists are legitimate, the tide can 
turn in favor of the terrorists.50 The 
population may then be induced to 
revolt. 
Although the parallels between the 
above cases are not exact, the grand 
pattern seems to hold. Terror begins in 
support of an idea. A core group acts 
upon the idea. The core group gains 
mass appeal. The support of the masses 
enables the creation of a political 
organization that eventually gains 
legitimacy. Once legitimate, the 
organization consolidates power, 
tyranny is imposed, and the movement 
seeks to expand its sphere of influence.   
Once an ideology rationalizes the 
illegitimate use of violence, terrorism 
becomes a tactic used throughout the 
evolution of the movement. Because of 
this ideological rationalization in the 
respective movements, terrorism has 
become, to many in the West, 
synonymous with first Communism, 
then Islam.  Although terror was and is a 
hallmark of these movements, terror 
alone could not accomplish the desired 
social change.   
A coup d’état can replace the existing 
regime but is possible only if the 
conspirators are already part of the state 
power structure. For those who are not 
in power to effect radical change, the 
support of the population is necessary. 
When overly relied upon, terror can 
alienate the public from whom support 
is sought. Without the support of the 
people, terror groups are easily isolated, 
tracked down, and eliminated.  
When the ire of the state is brought to 
bear on the isolated terror group, 
members of that group are forced to flee 
or be destroyed. Acts of terror, however, 
can be applied in such a way as to 
compel the state to repress the people as 
a whole, which in turn pushes the 
population into, rather than away from, 
the camp of the terrorists. Once this 
happens, the terrorist can transform 
into a revolutionary movement where 
there is strength in numbers. Acts of 
terror evolve into mob violence, such as 
riots, which further enflames the wrath 
of the state. Reactionary state violence 
pushes the mob to organize armed 
resistance; the revolutionary movement 
can then be described as an 
insurrection.   
Successful insurrection puts the 
leaders of the revolutionary movement 
into power.  In the minds of the leaders, 
the success of their movement validates 
the use of violence. There is no incentive 
to abandon a successful tactic. 
MYER S , TE R R O R IS T  T O  TYR AN T  15 
HO M E L A N D  SE C U R IT Y  AFFA IRS , VO L U M E  7, AR T IC L E  6 (FE B R U A R Y  2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
PREDICTING AND PREVENTING 
TERRORISM 
Predicting terrorism is not the goal of 
counterterrorism intelligence. 
Preventing terrorism is the goal. If the 
intelligence community (IC) predicts a 
terror group will blow up a particular 
building and that act comes to pass, 
then the IC has done a great job of 
predicting terrorism, but the terrorists 
have scored a victory. Preventing 
terrorism involves predicting aspects of 
terrorism.   
The Terrorist Value Chain breaks 
down terror operations into the steps 
necessary to produce an attack, from 
planning, to gathering resources, to 
carrying out the operation.  Value Chain 
Analysis is a good tool for identifying 
where and how to task information 
collection and also to identify indicators 
of impending terror operations. 
Predicting terrorism is most effective 
in tasking collection efforts and 
determining indicators rather than in 
identifying a particular attack. The goal 
is to get “inside” the terrorists’ 
operational cycle in order to disrupt the 
operation. Stopping terrorists at the site 
of the attack is the last chance and least 
desirable moment to disrupt the 
operation. Interdicting reconnaissance 
of targets, denying or confiscating 
resources and capturing leaders can stop 
a terror operation before it can be 
implemented. In order to prevent terror 
operations at these earlier stages, a 
comprehensive understanding of 
terrorist motivation, organization, 
targeting preferences and tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) is 
necessary.   
The six stages of the Revolutionary 
Terrorist Value Chain enable 
intelligence analysts to determine how 
best to counter terrorism. Different 
stages of terrorism call for different 
methods of collection and counter 
actions. 
Stage One: Ideological Development.  
An ideology is developed that 
rationalizes the illegitimate use of 
violence. At this stage the struggle is one 
of words and ideas. The government can 
censor the terrorist ideologues but this 
often proves counterproductive. The 
revolutionaries will challenge such 
censorship as an attack on human 
rights. It is better to expose the 
revolutionaries’ terror-supported 
philosophy in order to educate the 
public and turn them away from an 
ideology that supports the use of 
violence. 
Stage Two: Small Group Terror. A 
core group acts upon the ideas 
developed in stage one. The government 
must take care not to react with such 
repressive violence as to alienate the 
populace. The terror groups must be 
delegitimized in the eyes of the people. 
Terrorists are criminals and must be 
treated as such. The government must 
assure its citizens that the rule of law 
will not be forsaken. 
Stage Three: Mass Civil Unrest and 
Revolution. The ideology gains mass 
appeal, enabling the core group to create 
a political organization that eventually 
gains legitimacy. Non-violent means to 
effect acceptable change must be made 
available to the citizen. Revolutions 
generally don’t happen in democracies 
because the citizen is a part of the 
governing process and feels empowered 
to correct the perceived problems of 
society. 
Stage Four: Revolutionary Victory 
and Consolidation of Power. The 
revolution overthrows the former 
government and the core group 
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consolidates power. Terror becomes a 
mechanism to eliminate rival political 
groups (political rivals). In this stage the 
indigenous government no longer exists 
or is in exile. Foreign governments may 
try exerting international pressure to 
moderate extremist behavior. 
Stage Five: Tyranny. A power struggle 
within the core group ensues. The most 
ruthless win and impose an autocratic 
regime. Terror becomes a standard tool 
of the state, used to repress opposition 
and indoctrinate the population. 
International pressure can be brought 
against such a regime; sanctions can be 
put in place to induce the terror regime 
to behave in an acceptable manner 
towards its citizens. Opposition groups 
can be given foreign aid and intelligence 
operations can be used to expose the 
abuses of the regime. 
Stage Six: Export of Terror and 
Expansion. The regime seeks to expand 
its sphere of influence. Terror or the 
threat of terror is exported as a tool of 
foreign policy to threaten hostile states. 
Intelligence must collect information to 
prove the links between the terror 
regime and the terrorists it supports 
outside its borders. Such proof allows 
international pressure to be brought to 
bear. 
CONCLUSION 
Combating terror is first and foremost 
an ideological struggle. Those seeking 
change through violence are inherently 
antagonistic towards democracy and 
those who disagree are the enemy. 
Terrorists dehumanize their targets – 
for Marxists there were the capitalist 
pigs and for the Jihadist there are the 
infidel dogs. Terrorists view every 
member of society as complicit in the 
sins of the government; those not with 
them are against them.  
Religion is often cited as the cause of 
violence. This is rarely the case – 
religion is used to recruit and incite.  It 
is used to motivate followers in the 
pursuit of a political or military 
objective. If this is true, then the current 
wave of Islamic terrorism is not 
necessarily a natural outgrowth of Islam. 
The objectives of Jihadist leaders are the 
same as that of the Social 
Revolutionaries at the beginning of the 
last century. The objective is to replace 
the existing power structure with one of 
their own, with themselves in complete 
and total control in order to implement 
their ideology.  
What, then, can we expect to see in 
the development of international Islamic 
revolutionary terrorism? Although it 
remains a threat, the core group of al 
Qaeda has been heavily damaged by the 
U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks. Using 
the Revolutionary Value Chain, this 
places us in the third stage: Mass Civil 
Unrest and Revolution. Of greater 
concern than individual terror attacks is 
the wider movement inspired and 
motivated by jihadist ideology.51 
Counterterrorism does not take place in 
a vacuum but must be linked to a larger 
strategy with geopolitical objectives.52 
The primary objective of 
counterterrorism strategy must be the 
neutralization of the enemy ideology 
without which he cannot progress 
through the RTVC. 
In order to win the ideological 
struggle, the ideology of the terrorist 
must be shown to be illegitimate. 
Counterterrorism often requires the 
application of military force. If, however, 
terrorists are treated as lawful 
combatants they gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public. In general, terrorists 
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should be treated as criminals in order 
to deny them legitimacy; military action 
should be reserved for cases of 
immediate public endangerment.53   
Terrorists are politically motivated 
criminals. Law enforcement must be 
effective enough to track down and kill 
or capture terrorists and the legal 
system must be robust enough to try and 
convict terrorists. In fighting these 
criminals, the legal system must be 
protected from abuse or the state risks 
losing the support of the people. 
Terrorist claims of injustice from the 
legal system reinforce their ideology and 
potentially gain them popular support.54  
The United States must publicly display 
respect for international law and human 
rights, which simultaneously increases 
the legitimacy of our cause while 
undermining the terrorist cause.55 
The intent of terrorists is to compel 
some form of policy change, to influence 
the population or to punish a 
government for failing to address the 
terrorist’s demands.56  Giving in to those 
demands proves to the terrorist that his 
tactics work and he is more likely to 
employ them again. The government 
must never be seen to acquiesce to the 
demands of a terrorist organization. 
Still, it is necessary to address the 
factors that contribute to the growth of 
an ideology and provide an alternative 
to violence for a dissatisfied 
population.57 
Terrorists use illegitimate means to 
come to power and then, when in power, 
usually continue to use illegitimate 
means to govern, resulting in crimes 
against humanity such as were 
perpetrated by Stalin and Khomeini 
against their own countrymen. The 
motivation and intent of terrorists must 
be understood in order to counter them 
– if western governments understand 
their grievances, we may be able to 
address the root problem.  
Understanding, however, is not to be 
confused with empathy.   
  Empathy may cause the terrorists to 
be viewed as a legitimate opposition 
group, which gives them an advantage in 
the intellectual fight. Just as the 
revolutionary movement is trying to 
gain mass support, the state must vie for 
the “hearts and minds” of the 
population.  Regardless of the nature of 
the complaint made against the existing 
social order it is unlawful action which 
renders the terrorist a criminal. That 
point must be clearly communicated to 
the public so they understand the 
illegitimate nature of the terrorist.   
If there are legitimate injustices 
against which the terrorist acts, then 
remove the injustice and eliminate a 
motivational factor. It may then be 
possible to guide or influence the 
revolutionary terrorist to abandon 
unlawful violence in favor of democracy. 
Win the ideological battle and victory in 
the operational battle will follow. 
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